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Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-America World. New York: W.W. Norton, 
2008. 
 
Fareed Zakaria’s recent work, The Post-American World, is clearly 
destined to be an influential one, as shown by its widespread reviews. 
This is probably because it come at a time when American's are at last 
prepared to understand that they are in the grips of major change, some 
aspects of which are far from positive ones, such as a declining dollar 
and rising oil prices, and a prolonged war. Zakaria is also a familiar and 
respected media figure. He is an editor of Newsweek's International 
Edition, and a prolific writer on economic issues. In addition he has an 
hourly TV interview program on CNN. [1]  
 
Zakaria has what has in the past been a tough argument for Americans to 
swallow. He believes that the U.S. is clearly in an inevitable relative 
decline in terms of its power, influence and wealth. This decline is not 
caused by a Spenglerian [2] "Decline of the West," but by the "Rise of 
the Rest," most notably by the rapid progress of China and of India.  
 
"Three Forces" have contributed to this decline, according to Zakaria, 
"Politics, Economics, and Technology." [3] At Interface we are 
primarily interested in the last of these, of course, as it is fairly described 
as the impact of the Internet.  
 
Works comparing Asia and the West are by no means new, nor was 
Spengler the first to warn of inevitable decline. As early as the17th 
century, European Jesuits living in China were writing appreciations of 
Chinese society. Sometimes these were honest attempts to understand a 
highly developed non-European society. More often than not, however, 
such analysts used Asia as a tool with which to criticize their own 
culture, perhaps for its materialism, or its lack of stability and order. 
! 153!
 
This trope of the failing West and the admirable East has continued to be 
a staple of East-West comparisons then, for more than five hundred 
years. A recent approach has been a cautionary one by which 
intellectuals measure America in particular against an Asian culture---
most recently China or India---and find it either gratifyingly successful 
or give warning of its imminent decline and fall.  
 
An example of the cautionary school was Paul Kennedy's 1987 work, 
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. While Kennedy was mostly 
concerned about internal factors explaining the decline of great empires, 
particularly expensive military overextension, he directly applied his 
arguments to the United States. His position while widely discussed and 
ultimately influential was also roundly pilloried both by offended 
American conservatives and by critical academics. [4] 
 
Kennedy's work, among other factors, evoked a sort of intellectual 
riposte from conservatives such as David M. Landes. [5] Landes wrote a 
very well received work, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some 
Are So Rich and Some Are So Poor, published a decade later. Landes' 
theme was a familiar one of late 20th century market (and American) 
triumphalism. 
 
According to Landes, the West, and particularly the United States, 
simply had a superior culture, particularly in its Judaeo-Christian roots, 
which prized private property and thus encouraged individual initiative. 
Asians, however, were too often in the grips of strong states which 
prevented markets and individuals from working their magic. By this 
time, a decade after Kennedy had written and during which the United 
States had arguably ascended rather than declined, Landes, like so many 
others, was able to pretty much ignore Kennedy as a typical academic 
alarmist. The decade from Landes' publication in 1998 to 2008, 
however, has seen a great many changes. The spectacular continuing 
"rise" of China and the rapid recent decline of the American economy 
and other economies closely linked to it, such as England's, has brought 
a new perspective to the discussions. 
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National Public Radio recently reviewed a number of books making 
quite a different argument than did Landes, by three authors holding 
from different perspectives a position much closer to Kennedy than to 
Landes. [6] Zakaria, then, is suddenly well within a very broad emerging 
analysis. Zakaria, however, is almost soothing in his approach to what in 
the past has been viewed as an alarmist if not downright terrifying 
perspective. In part this is, I think, because Zakaria, despite his Indian 
birth and his eminence in the media, seems, well, to be one of us. He too 
is paying much more for his gasoline, and probably flying less and 
enjoying it less, as well. And his position nicely takes the moral sting out 
of even relative decline; it is not our fault. 
 
The problem is not that we have changed; we have, in fact, been highly 
successful. Much of the world wants what we want, and intends to get it 
in much the same way as we did: though reliance on capitalist market 
forces. "We" won, then. So why does it seem so much like a loss to us? 
And what caused it?  
 
Zakaria easily answers this latter question; we leave the former one to 
each of our readers to ruminate for him- or her self. According to 
Zakaria: "Since the 1980s, these three forces--politics, economics, and 
technology----have pushed in the same direction to produce a more 
open, connected, exacting international environment." [7] 
 
In this review we choose to focus upon one of these forces, obviously 
upon the impact of technology. But Zakaria gives a wonderful treatment 
of both politics and economics as well, giving just enough comparative 
information and historical background to make the reader ultimately 
comfortable with his conclusions. 
 
The relationship between technology and the "Rise of the Rest" is easily 
summarized. It is a result of near-instantaneous communications, which 
makes it possible for capital and labor, those familiar factors of the 
productive processes, to rapidly seek environments in which return upon 
them can be maximized. Arbitrage, the movement of money, and 
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outsourcing of both labor and factories, then, have enabled others to 
meet and surpass American standards.  
 
The results of these changes, however, are not simple nor always 
negative for the United States nor positive for others. Zakaria's contacts 
and wide understanding of politics and economics lets him move easily 
from his analysis of causes to a very thorough analysis of the broad 
consequences. 
 
It seems to us that of all the works we have reviewed in Interface 
touching upon this element of our contemporary world, from Landes to 
Greenspan, Zakaria's is the most thoughtful and readable one, fully 
deserving its current widespread notice. 
 
[1] See his webpage at: http://www.fareedzakaria.com.  
[2] Oswald Spengler was, of course, an earlier critic of Western 
progress who argued in 1918 that weaknesses in Western 
philosophy inevitably doomed it to fail to progress and 
compete. There is a sense in which Fareed and Spengler might 
be said to agree in that Spengler believed that all great societies 
would inevitably be superceded by newer more vigorous ones. 
See a useful but incomplete Wikipedia discussion at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Decline_of_the_West.  
[3] For his discussion of the three forces begin at p. 21.  
[4] For one such review, downloadable in PDF, see Henry R. Nau, 
"Why  'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers' was wrong" in 
the Review of International Studies (2001), 27, 579–592 
Copyright British International Studies Association at: 
http://www.nationalism.org/library/science/ir/nau/nau-ris2001-
27-04.pdf.  
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[5] For two editorial pieces discussing the broader issue of Western 
vs. Eastern economic standing, see Jeffrey Barlow "Paradigms 
of World History and American Technology" at: 
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2005/06/edit.php and Jeffrey 
Barlow "American Exceptionalism and Technological 
Development" at 
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/journal/2005/07/edit.php.  
[6] Hear: "The Growing Economic Influence of China and India" 
at: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9003031
9.  
[7] p. 25.  
